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Jorge Ponce

PhD in Economics

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Tópicos sobre instituciones de supervisión bancaria – Maestría dECON

Topicos sobre instituciones de supervision bancaria

1. Análisis normativo de la estructura de gobierno de los supervisores.

  • Ponce, J. 2010 “A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability.” Money Affairs XXIII (2).
  • Quintyn, M., Ramirez, S., Taylor, M. W., 2007. The fear of freedom: Politicians and the independence and accountability of nancial sector supervisors in practice. In: Masciandaro, D., Quintyn, M. (Eds.), Designing Financial Supervision Institutions: Independence, Accountability and Governance. Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar, pp. 63-116.
  • Quintyn, M., Taylor, M. W., 2003. Regulatory and supervisory independence and nancial stability. CESifo Economic Studies 49 (2), 259-295.

2. Red de seguridad, conflicto de intereses y organización institucional.

  • Kahn, C.M., Santos, J.A., 2005. Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision. Eur. Econ. Rev. 49, 2107–2136.
  • Kahn, C.M., Santos, J.A., 2006. Who should act as lender of last resort? An incomplete contracts model: a comment. J. Money Credit Bank. 38 (4), 1111–1118.
  • Boyer, P. C. y Ponce, J. 2010. Regulatory capture and banking super vision reform. Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper 2010-83.  TRANSPARENCIA
  • Ponce, J. 2010. Lender of last resort policy: What reforms are necessary? Journal of Financial Intermediation 19(2), 188-206.
  • Repullo, R., 2000.Who should act as lender of last resort? An incomplete contracts model. J. Money Credit Bank 32 (3), 580–605.

3. Comunicación y estabilidad financiera.

  • Born, B. Ehrmann, M. and Fratzscher, M. 2010. Macroprudential Policy and Central Bank Communication. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8094.
  • Kahn, C.M., Santos, J.A., 2006. Who should act as lender of last resort? An incomplete contracts model: a comment. J. Money Credit Bank. 38 (4), 1111–1118.
  • Ponce, J. 2010. Lender of last resort policy: What reforms are necessary? Journal of Financial Intermediation 19(2), 188-206.

4. Competencia y estabilidad financiera.

  • Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000. Comparing Financial Systems. MIT Press.
  • Boyd, J., De Nicolo, G., 2005. The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited. Journal of Finance 60, 1329-1343.
  • Gómez, F. y Ponce, J. 2011. Competition, screening and credit quality. Documento de trabajo

5. Agencias calificadoras y estabilidad financiera

  • Mathis, J., McAndrews, J., Rochet, J.-C., 2009. Rating the raters: are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies? Journal of Monetary Economics 56 (5), 657-674.
  • Ponce. J. 2011. The quality of credit ratings: A two-sided market perspective. Documento de trabajo

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